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Introduction  
 
“Young people become radicalized due to different needs and motivations. If 
interventions are to be effective, these different needs and motivations should be 
addressed. There is no one fixed intervention for all. Responses from all different 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, Email: fazmiya@tum.ac.ke; Department of Social 
Sciences, Technical University of Mombasa, P.O. Box 90420 -80100, Mombasa, Kenya. 
Abstract 
The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) discourse in Kenya reflects the larger 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) policy framework. Donor-driven governmental 
approaches support the top-down efforts to counter violent extremism. CVE 
initiatives now emerging in response to the rise of homegrown violent extremism in 
Kenya, in contrast, seek to encourage more community participation in the campaign 
to limit the activities of Al-Shabaab. This article examines existing countering 
violent extremism (CVE) initiatives in order to elucidate the effectiveness and 
shortcomings of CVE interventions. The findings are based on an ethnographic study 
in the coastal region of Kenya comprising of 249 in-depth interviews with key 
informants, observations and eight focus group discussions. The article maps existing 
CVE projects across Kenya’s coast including the prevention framework of primary, 
secondary and tertiary interventions as modelled on preventative public health 
approaches. Assessment of existing CVE programs provides information elucidating 
what works and for whom from a community perspective. Feedback from the 
community is critical for, facilitating effective measures for mitigating the process 
of youth radicalization in the coast region. The findings reported here recommend 
periodic consultation with the intended beneficiaries and other CVE initiatives’ 
stakeholders to enhance the sustainability of the projects. 
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stakeholders are needed for mitigating youth radicalization and recruitment for the 
Al-Shabaab”2 
 
Youth radicalization and recruitment by the Al-Shabaab Islamist insurgency3 has become a core 
security concern in Kenya since the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) military intervention into 
Somalia in October 2011. The intention was to create a buffer to prevent Al-Shabaab extremism 
spilling into Kenya, but the occupation of the Jubaland region instead exacerbated problems of 
homegrown radicalization and recruitment (International Crisis Group, 2014). Al-Shabaab 
recruiters succeed by tapping into long-standing grievances associated with the poverty and 
neglect of the peripheral coastal and north-eastern regions during the post-independence era 
(Badurdeen, 2012; International Crisis Group, 2014). The magnitude of the youth radicalization 
and recruitment problem prompted the state’s security agencies and development partners to 
formulate and execute counter terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization policies 
(Prevention of Terrorism Act – 2012; Security Laws (Amendment) Act – 2014; and, the 
National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, in 2016) based on the globally framed 
countering violent extremism (CVE) discourse (Global Counter Terrorism Strategy – 2006) 
Countering radicalization and recruitment requires a spectrum of multi-faceted 
initiatives including apprehending extremist leaders and radical entrepreneurs, increasing 
development investments in marginalized areas of the coast and the north eastern regions, 
rehabilitation of radicalized former combatants, and promoting values of inclusivity to mitigate 
the spread of extremist ideology. This entails interventions addressing the three prevention 
levels of the public health model (primary, secondary and tertiary). Primary prevention is a 
broad approach aimed at the whole society. Interventions at this level aim at mitigating the root 
causes of extremist behavior by addressing social grievances that drive populations to violent 
                                                 
2 Interview, NGO Personnel, March 02, 2016. 
3 Al-Shabaab known as the ‘Youth’ is a Jihadist fundamentalist group in East Africa originating from Somalia. 
The insurgency movement originated as a hard-lined youth militant group under the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 
in Somalia. The movement aimed to wage Jihad against the enemies of Islam and engaged in combat against the 
Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The movement has 
attracted youth from Kenya and other countries from East Africa. 
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extremism. Secondary prevention aims at individual and groups identified as at risk4 for violent 
extremism. Interventions at this level target the prevention of radicalization progression and 
reducing attempt for future radicalization. Tertiary prevention focuses on radicalized 
individuals or groups actively planning, recruiting for violent extremist cause (Challgren, et al. 
2016). 
As in many parts of the world, in Kenya the umbrella term Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) refers to efforts to prevent and counter the process of radicalization leading 
to terrorism. This article uses the term CVE to explain interventions aimed at mitigating violent 
extremism with regard to Al-Shabaab’s activities in Kenya. In this article, CVE refers to current 
policies and practices for preventing and countering radicalization and recruitment into violent 
extremism and terrorism. Over the longer run, CVE is a core component of a nation’s larger 
counter terrorism framework and strategy. The definition includes interventions ranging from 
community awareness, civic education, countering extremist narratives, community 
engagement, community policing, counter recruitment strategies, disengagement and 
demobilization, and rehabilitation for individuals who had engaged in violent extremism. 
This article examines ongoing CVE initiatives in the coastal region of Kenya based on 
narratives and observations concerning their effectiveness and gaps. The study focuses on how 
respondents involved in coastal CVE initiatives felt about the programs’ impact on the ground. 
This was important to understand the effectiveness of CVE programmes in the coastal region 
and to understand the impact of the programmes at different levels of interventions: primary, 
secondary and tertiary. The article is divided into three parts. The first section describes the 
evolving CVE discourse and interventions in Kenya. The second section maps the CVE 
interventions at primary, secondary and tertiary levels as defined by the public health model. 
The final section provides the conclusion highlighting the pathway for enhancing CVE 
interventions in coastal Kenya.  
                                                 
4 This includes individuals or groups at risk for Al-Shabaab radicalization or recruitment, such as individuals prone 
to violent gangs or crimes, drug abuse, live in particular hotspots for radicalization or have friends or family 
members associated to the Al-Shabaab. 
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Methods and sources 
 
This article is an outcome on the first author’s PhD field research of 18 months (December 
2015 to June 2017), comprising of 249 interviews with key informants such as religious, 
community leaders, government officials, youth labelled as or accused of being Al-Shabaab 
radicals, and their family members as shown in the table below. The study explored the push 
and pull factors for youth radicalization in the coastal region of Kenya, for the terrorist network 
Al-Shabaab. Social movement theory (SMT) shaped the theoretical framework for the study to 
understand the radicalization and recruitment process of youth into the Al-Shabaab movement 
from the coastal region. Most of the interviews lasted from 45 minutes to one hour. Interviews 
with family members of terror suspects ranged between one to two hours due to the need for 
time in building trust with the participants. Field interviews were recorded on notebooks and 
later transcribed. Twelve observations of the trials of terror suspects in courts, and eight focus 
group discussions also informed the study.  Consent had been obtained from the authorities for 
the observations. The study was carried out in four counties identified as hotspots in the coastal 
region of Kenya: Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu. 
Ethical issues were addressed at each phase of the study. In compliance with the 
Procedures and Guidelines for Research Authorization in Kenya regulations, permission for 
conducting the research was obtained prior to the conducting of the research such as the review 
by the ethical clearance committee by the Pwani University of Kenya and the research permit 
from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) that 
approved the research.  The research was carefully planned aimed to adhere fully to ethical 
standards and maintain safety to all concerned.  
Respondents were initially informed on the nature and motivations of the study so that 
they were able to decide on whether to participate in the study or not. A form was shared with 
the respondents that informed them of their guaranteed rights, and that the researcher involved 
in the study acknowledged the protection of their rights. The anonymity of respondents was 
protected by assigning fictitious names and numbers in their statements and in the reporting of 
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the results. This was to safeguard their security and to avoid any harm that could potentially 
affect them. The risks to the respondent were considered in terms of physical and psychological 
harm, risks to the individual’s personal standing within the communities they are a part of, 
privacy, personal values and beliefs, and threat to their families and their occupation. Careless 
references to offensive religious stereotyping, assumptions and other statements that may hurt 
the respondent were avoided. Due caution was taken in reference to emotional events that may 
arise during the course of the study. The researcher ensured the confidentiality of participants, 
and the anonymity of respondents and locations where meeting were held. 
 
Table 1 – Key Informant Details 
 Mombasa Kwale  Kilifi Lamu Total 
Youth labeled radicals 16 3 2  21 
Convicted youth radicals/returnees 3 3 2 1 9 
Family members of radicals 9 2 5  16 
Religious leaders  4 4 4 4 16 
School Teachers/Madrasa 
Teachers 
4 4 2 2 12 
Law enforcement personnel 7 4 2 2 15 
Village elder/Community leaders 4 4 1 1 10 
NGO/INGO personnel involved or 
connected to de-radicalization 
organizations 
16 4 3 4 27 
Youth leaders 12 8 16 6 42 
Women leaders 3 3 3 3 12 
Academics 6  2  8 
Other community members/youth 32 14 8 7 61 
Total 249 
 
 
The evolving CVE discourse and interventions in Kenya 
 
CVE has its origins in the early European Exit programs in Norway, Germany and Sweden of 
the 1980s that focused on right wing violent extremism (Demant, et al. 2008). The Organization 
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for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) was among the first international bodies that 
recognized the need to address root causes of terrorism in contrast to the US response to the 
9/11 aftermath that focused mainly on conventional counterterrorism (OCSE, 2014). One of the 
first national level CVE programs was started in the United Kingdom in 2006 to counter 
homegrown violent extremism with emphasis on Islamic extremism (HM Government, 2006). 
In 2015, the White House summit drew international attention to the need for CVE to focus on 
building awareness of CVE, counter extremist narratives, and to emphasize community-led 
efforts (Chertoff, 2015).  
Kenya’s CVE initiatives emerged in response to the homegrown violent extremism 
supported by Al-Shabaab, although it was rooted in the historical landscapes of violent 
extremism across the Middle East, North Africa, the western Sahel, and the Horn of Africa 
(Davis 2010; Ridley 2014). The first Islamist terrorist attacks in Kenya were not directed at the 
Kenyan population or state, but targeted American and Israeli interests in the country. The 
suspect associated with the bomb that destroyed a wing of Nairobi’s Norfolk Hotel in 1980, 
Qaddura Mohamed Abdel al-Hamid, was a Moroccan supporter of the Palestinian cause 
motivated by Kenya’s logistical support for Israel during their raid on Entebbe in 1976. The 
bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania by Al-Qaeda affiliates in 1998 
signaled a new phase in the conflict (Vadlamudi 2007). Kenya’s position on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict featured in the bombing of the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa 
and failed attempt to shoot down an Israel charter plane in 2001 (Dunstan 2011; Beyer 2008). 
Early attacks in Kenya by Al-Shabaab’s Islamist terror network were a response to Kenya’s 
role as a proxy for American interventions in Somalia. Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya intensified 
after Kenyan Defense Forces entered Somalia to create a cross border buffer zone in October 
2011 (Hansen, 2013). Kenya subsequently suffered from repeated Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks, 
including the 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a series of raids in Lamu in 2014, 
and the Garissa University attack in 2015 (Cannon and Pakalya, 2017).  
In contemporary Kenya, youth radicalization into the Al-Shabaab poses as a security 
threat. Radicalization of young people raised considerable alarm when a broad range of ethnic 
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groups of Kenyan nationals were involved along with Somali nationals. These Kenyan youth 
mainly came from the North Eastern, Coast regions and urban informal settlements such as 
Majengo (informal settlement in Nairobi’s Eastlands). The context of youth being radicalized 
raised concerns when the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eriteria reported that hundreds 
of impoverished Kenyan youths were recruited into Al-Shabaab (UN Report, 2012).The Al-
Shabaab did not recruit only fighters from Kenya but also trained them as suicide bombers 
(Botha, 2013). For example, on 19 April 2007 a suicide bomber detonated his device as he 
crashed onto the gates of an Ethiopian army base in Mogadishu. The suicide bomber was 
identified as a Kenyan national Othman Otayo. Irrespective of exactly how many Kenyans have 
membership at Al-Shabaab, the cases identified are sufficient to justify closer scrutiny of the 
circumstances that increase the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalization and recruitment 
to organizations such as Al-Shabaab (Botha, 2013). Among them youth from impoverished 
regions (the Coast region) were very vulnerable as those who recruited new members used local 
vulnerabilities and contextual circumstances to their advantage. Kenya with its bulging youth 
population and the contextual factors provide a ripe situation for youth radicalization. Some of 
the driving factors for youth radicalization were as follows: discrimination, grievances, poverty, 
lack of opportunities in employment and education (Badurdeen, 2012).   
American and Israeli influence has been a primary influence on the Kenyan 
counterterrorism (CT) discourse. Apart from aid related incentives, the passing of anti-terrorism 
legislation and the formation of regional alliances under the US-East Africa Counterterrorism 
Initiative reinforced Kenya’s role as a close ally of the US led War on Terror (Prestholdt 2011; 
Mogire and Agade 2011; Ramraj et al. 2012). It is important to note that the US led Global War 
on Terror (GWOT) manifests in diverse ways in different localities due to its intersection with 
domestic and regional politics (Howell & Lind, 2009).  
Peace building efforts addressing ethnic and religious radicalization in the coastal region 
began with the Peace, Security and Development Program implemented by the Danish 
International Development Agency in 2005, which brought together five civil society 
organization to counter radicalization in the coastal region. Since then, the CT discourse has 
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emphasized CVE approaches based on strengthening community efforts to prevent and mitigate 
violent extremism. CVE programmes in the coast were further strengthened by the Kenya 
Transition Initiative (KTI), a USAID supported CVE initiative that focused on selected 
communities in Nairobi and on the coast (Mombasa, Lamu etc.) with the objective of mitigating 
key push and  pull factors for violent radicalization (DANIDA, 2015). The National Counter-
Terrorism strategy launched in 2015 marked the commitment of the government to incorporate 
soft approaches aimed at prevention complementing the state’s hard security measures for 
countering terrorism (Ruteere and Mutahi, 2018).  
The National CVE strategy (NCVE), officially launched in September 2016  expanded 
the focus, of the fight against terrorism by incorporating collaborative CVE approaches 
bringing together the government, communities, civil society, the international community, and 
the private sector.5 Subsequently, CVE plans have been decentralized through the design of 
county-level CVE action plans in Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Mombasa, and several counties in 
northern Kenya (Ogada, 2017). Partnerships with county governments and local community 
actors, particularly in those counties most affected, are required to increase the local legitimacy 
of CVE interventions6 taking into account the local framing and historization of the context of 
violent extremism and the genealogy of evolving violent extremist ideologies. Since 2016 
Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) funding has provided grants 
and training to civil society organizations (CSOs) in six counties on the Coast. The county 
government plan of Kwale is commendable in this regard as it is among the first initiatives of 
CVE action plans designed at the county level. County level strategies focused on county 
specific push and pull factors on VE and sought to address VE using county specific 
interventions. The success of the Kwale county plan has facilitated the development of similar 
county action plans in Kilifi, Mombasa and Lamu.  
                                                 
5 There is a need for awareness on the national CVE strategy (NCVE) among the CSOs and the community 
members. At present, the National CVE strategy (NCVE) is undergoing its first review of the strategy. Identified 
gaps by the community such as the Economic and Gender pillar are to be incorporated in to this strategy reflecting 
the needs of the community.   
6 Interview, community mobilizer, February 12, 2017. 
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Interventions at the primary level 
 
Primary prevention based on the public health model emphasizes on a broad approach directed 
towards the whole society. The focus of interventions is to mitigate the root causes of extremist 
behavior by addressing social grievances of populations sympathetic to violent extremism. 
Interventions at this level include addressing deep-rooted grievances stemming from the lack 
of educational and job opportunities while supporting social engagement, cultural awareness, 
and youth development programs.  
The dearth of socio-economic opportunities, discrimination resulting from 
marginalization, poor governance abetting the deteriorating state-citizen relationship, violation 
of human rights, and selective application of the rule of law contribute to coastal communities’ 
collective grievances. The same factors act as push factors for recruits embracing violent 
extremism (Badurdeen, 2012; Botha, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2012). Al-Shabaab 
recruiters exploit these collective grievances in their radicalization and recruitment strategies 
by crafting ideologically driven narratives focusing on a common enemy in the form of the 
Kenyan state’ and its Western government partners’,7 while highlighting the plight of 
communities and individual victims (Badurdeen, 2016). Recruiters follow up by responding to 
their needs in terms of materialistic and/or spiritual support.8 
Addressing the collective grievances of the coastal population is now central to primary 
interventions on CVE. A main reason being that if collective grievances of marginalization and 
poor governance is addressed it has the ability to reduce the appeal for violent extremist 
networks such as the Al-Shabaab, that thrives on narratives pegged to collective grievances.9 
Investment in development projects, inclusive of mega development or infrastructural projects 
is a viable option for job creation, among other economic opportunities, which can deter young 
people from being driven into radical groups (Kessels and Nemr, 2016; USAID, 2011). Al-
                                                 
7 United States and her European allies in the GWOT are referred to as the West. 
8 Interview, women leader, March 22, 2016. 
9 Interview, women leader, August 12, 2016. 
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Shabaab followers and sympathizers motivated primarily by economic hardship could be 
deterred by increased developmental inputs for poverty ridden localities.10 Most youth at risk 
of radicalization or recruitment come from economically deprived pockets of the coastal region 
where they face limited viable options for employment.11 The government and civil society 
actors should focus on providing more resources to address the root causes associated with 
socio-economic drivers of violent radicalization. An interviewee explained that increased 
investment in public education, poverty reduction, and unemployment is pivotal to counter Al-
Shabaab radicalization in the coast12. Such initiatives will help youth find purpose within their 
communities, preventing them from seeking new identities through a radical Al-Shabaab 
ideology.13 
Investment in large projects such as public infrastructure projects at the coastal region 
have the potential to generate jobs for youth who are at risk of joining extremist causes.14 This 
will not happen without specific mechanisms designed to benefit the local youth in the 
communities. For example, mega projects such as the LAPPSET (Lamu Port and Southern 
Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor) generate opposition due to the lack of participation by the 
local communities and the perception that most of the jobs created will benefit outsiders 
(Badurdeen and Ndenyele, 2014). 15 Other factors included ethnic favoritism and the youth’s 
lack of skills matching the labor required by projects. This is why these projects tend to be 
viewed as government-led initiatives more likely to benefit outsiders than the local 
population.16   
Educational and vocational training, career guidance programs, credit schemes and 
networking opportunities can be harnessed to improve local youth’s employment prospects.17 
                                                 
10 Interview, Community Mobilizer, May 05, 2016. 
11 Interview, Community Mobilizer, June 12, 2016. 
12 Interview, Youth Leader, September 09, 2016. 
13 Interview, Community Leader, January 02, 2017. 
14 Interview, Religious Leader, March 15, 2016. 
15 Outsiders here refer to people who are from outside regions of the country, and do not reside or have coast as 
their origins. 
16 Interview, Youth Leader, May 09, 2017. 
17 Field Notes, August 09, 2016. 
  
 
 
 
 
Badurdeen & Goldsmith: Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the 
Coastal Region of Kenya 
 
 
 
 
80 
The livelihood potential of the coastal region need to be harnessed through policies targeting 
the modernization of fishing industry, revival of the coconut and the cashew nut industries, 
training for the hospitality trade, and support for the other informal sector businesses that 
currently employ a significant number of coastal youths.18  
Another factor that is often cited as problematic is the issue of land ownership in the 
coastal region of Kenya.19 Land grievances reflecting the marginalization of the coastal region 
are a product of policies embraced by the succession of post-independence government policies. 
The issue of land has played a core role in social movements in the coast, such as the Mombasa 
Republican Council and extremist groups like Kaya Bombo in Kwale, and was cited in the Al 
Shabaab statement justifying the raids on upcountry settlers in Lamu. Implementing the land 
reforms mandated by the new constitution and the issuance of title deeds demand immediate 
attention to address such long standing issues.20 
Poor governance and corruption is responsible for the lack of trust in the government, 
generating disillusionment in many coastal communities. Devolution under the 2010 
Constitution was to provide answers to the existing governance deficit (Nyanjom, 2011; Bosire, 
2013). The system of county governments has, however, fostered elite communities where 
employment opportunities are still based on patronage and development rarely trickles down to 
the marginalized households.21 Al-Shabaab recruiters prey on disillusioned members of 
communities such as youth who are frustrated by the Kenya’s political elite’s culture of 
impunity. Civil society actors should therefore play an active role with other stakeholders such 
as traditional elders and religious leaders to improve monitoring of new developments 
contributing to the region’s marginalization.22 
                                                 
18 Interview, Community Mobilizer, January 02, 2017. 
19 Most community members live as tenets in their own lands due to the lack of title deeds. Issuance of title deeds 
to coastal people has been controversial due to multiple ownerships and lack of documentation. 
20 Interview, women leader, May 07, 2016. 
21 Interview, Religious Leader, May 21, 2016. 
22 Interview, Academic, March 03, 2016. 
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One interviewee highlighted the need for trust building efforts between law enforcement 
and communities. Community-based law enforcement programs can improve the relationships 
and generate trust between police forces and communities.23 STRIVE II (Strengthening 
Resilience to Violent Extremism) has focused on promoting interaction between law 
enforcement and civil society by building the capacity of security sector and law enforcement 
authorities and civil society to collaborate in preventing violent extremism (RUSI, 2017). The 
effectiveness of the Independent Policing Oversight Authority is crucial in investigating all 
forms of police misconduct including deaths in custody and serious injuries as a result of police 
action as it has the authority to investigate complaints against the police, monitor police 
operations and to look into particular incidents if delayed. These initiatives facilitate awareness 
raising for law enforcement agencies personnel about violent extremism drivers and CVE 
responses (CHRIPS, 2014). The role that civil society can play, as well as their attitude and 
behaviour towards the police, can foster building a more collaborative and inclusive partnership 
leading to positive citizen-law enforcement relations that help undermine the narratives of 
extremist groups and reduce recruitment (Brett and Kahlmeyer, 2017). 
Despite the success of security sector hard responses in temporarily quelling violent 
extremism, the indiscriminate execution of these actions exerts unintended impacts due to the 
radicalizing impact on innocent individuals and at-risk youth.24 They can also radicalize 
sympathetic groups or produce new offshoots of extremist groups.25 Kenya’s security sector 
must reassess its counterterrorism strategy’s consequences for marginalized groups, 
particularly Somali Muslims and coastal Muslims (Badurdeen, 2017). This is vital for 
community policing efforts that require continuous engagement with local communities. 
Community trust depends on the credibility of the security sector in respect to thorough and 
timely investigations into allegations of arbitrary detention, raids, arrests, extrajudicial killings 
and use of torture by the security forces (Ayiera, 2015). States become part of the problem in 
                                                 
23 Field Notes, May 07, 2016. 
24 Interview, CBO Personnel, April 14, 2017. 
25 Interview, women leader, June 11, 2016. 
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nurturing violent extremism when institutions fail to implement laws, lack the capacity to 
effectively prosecute crimes related to violent extremism, or when they go beyond the existing 
laws or resort to non-conventional ways for dealing with violent extremism (Sodipo, 2013). 
These problems feed the collective grievances narrative of indigenous coastal communities and 
provide the justification, extremists exploit through narratives focusing on the unfair treatment 
by the government and law enforcement officers.26 Such problematic state responses towards 
extremism are based on the tendency to over-react, resulting in vulnerable populations feeling 
they are the target of politically motivated and religiously biased security practices and unjust 
judicial systems (UNDP, 2016:19).  
Swift government responses in the aftermath of the Westgate terrorist attack in Kenya 
prompted changes in the counter terrorism (CT) discourse. First, the government strengthened 
the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act and passed amendments to the Security (Amendment) 
Act of 2014. Responses to civil society included freezing accounts of NGOs and CBOs, 
accusing NGOs/CBOs of funding or aiding terrorism, and blaming NGOs and some donors for 
disrupting government-led counterterrorism initiatives. The changes resulted in more scrutiny 
of organizations and their interventions that acted to narrow the political space for dissent and 
advocacy criticizing government CT measures (Kenya Human Rights Commission Report, 
2016). This has wider implications for the overall CVE approach as NGOs respond by 
harmonizing CVE projects and NGO policies with government-led CT strategies and by 
reducing criticism of government CT strategies by NGOs. This is needed to prevent local 
communities from disconnecting with NGOs labelled as being anti-government due to ‘fear’ of 
be associated with these NGOs. 
Therefore, addressing the primary level focus of the public health model facilitates 
interventions towards the whole society, with specific efforts to reduce collective grievances in 
the region. For, the focus of interventions is to mitigate the root causes of extremist behavior 
by addressing social grievances of populations sympathetic to violent extremism via addressing 
                                                 
26 Interview, women leader, January 14, 2017. 
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macro-level issues such as poverty, marginalization, governance and improving citizen-state 
relationships. 
 
Interventions at the secondary level   
 
Secondary prevention addresses individuals and groups identified as at-risk for violent 
extremism. Interventions at this level include community engagement and counter-messaging. 
Here, the focus of the interventions includes the prevention of the radicalization progression 
and minimization of potential for future radicalization (Challgren et. al. 2016). This entails 
disrupting an existing milieu favourable for radicalization by addressing enabling factors such 
as peer influence in radicalization and recruitment of youth, the need for group bonding, group 
socialization processes, and group solidarity. Counter measures include addressing the ideology 
of the extremist group, closing channels in which ideologies are promoted, or removing the 
promoter of the ideology or the recruiter (UNDP, 2017). Disrupting these networks became a 
key in CT or CVE approaches. In coastal Kenya, most interventions targeted at the meso-level 
focus predominantly on countering radical ideologies.27 Initiatives such as the Council of 
Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), and 
Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) have generated critical arguments 
countering the religious basis for radical Islamist ideology, including replacing verses of the 
Quran and the hadith seen as misused.28. BRAVE uses religious scriptures to engage in 
theological debates with radical preachers.29 However, there is a need for countering secular 
narratives used by the Al-Shabaab and local influencers to promote these narratives. 
Identification of at-risk groups and locations providing an enabling environment for 
radicalization are important. Programs aimed at risk communities do well by focusing on 
narrowly defined groups, targeted with great precision supported by a strong evidence-base 
                                                 
27 Interview, CBO Personnel, June 02, 2016. 
28 Hadith includes the body of sayings, words, actions and habits attributed to the Prophet Muhamed. 
29 Interview, Religious Leader, February 28, 2016. 
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prior to program designing (USAID 2014). For example, focus should be on religious converts 
who are vulnerable due to the lack of proper Islamic teachings, gang members who show 
potential for deviant behavior, family members and friends of Al-Shabaab suspects who have 
close ties with radicals, and substance users and other individuals at risk due to various financial 
or ideological motivations.30 
SUPKEM and CIPK focus on a prevention strategy based on using the role of religion 
to design inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues between diverse actors.31 Designing of counter 
narratives specific to young people and their present lives offers greater potential for results 
than more general approaches. The deconstruction of a Quranic verse’s use by extremists may 
not suffice to convince for many vulnerable young people. The radicals have an advantage over 
manipulating Quranic verses as they craft it to the specific needs of the young person and use 
charismatic leaders in ideology propagation.32 A respondent explained the need for 
interventions to focus more predominantly on ideology, with an emphasis on group-level 
interventions. This assists in understanding how young people understand the ideology as well 
as the networks using these ideologies to build relationships.33 Effective counter-messages are 
dependent on appealing messages which are designed by youth as they know the needs of their 
cohort best and are thus able to craft appropriate ideological messages.34 Effective 
dissemination of information and counter-radicalization messages to the wider public is 
otherwise a function of the credibility of the source and impartial religious leaders. This requires 
authentic leaders who represent the religious traditions of the coastal Muslim community35 to 
mitigate Al-Shabaab radicalization. Partnering with other non-Muslim communities to discuss 
                                                 
30 For example, the STRIVE project has a mentorship project which works with marginalized youth by identifying 
and responding to their needs and working together in a process of dialogue, making them resilient to extremist 
narratives and incentives30. 
31 Interview, CBO Personnel, August 23, 2016. 
32 Field Notes, June 12, 2016; Interview, NGO Personnel, November 15, 2016. 
33 Interview, CBO Personnel, April 14, 2017. 
34 Interview, women leader, April 22, 2017. 
35 Field Notes, September 22, 2016. 
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particularly contested concepts of violence with regard to religion is also a necessity, as 
religious extremism affects all communities in the coast and other communities in Kenya.36 
Public awareness aimed at discouraging individuals to disengage or not join extremist 
groups have been the core of many awareness programs conducted by non-governmental 
organizations such as the Kenya Community Support Centre, Muslim for Human Rights 
(MUHURI) and HAKI Africa 37 These organizations have played an influential role in bringing 
national institutions, local government, religious entities and community representatives 
together to launch public awareness campaign directed at vulnerable communities and at risk 
youth.38 There is a need for similar programs reaching out to schools and universities in the 
coast considered to be hotspots for recruitment.39 Public awareness programs should also 
incorporate stories of survivors of terrorist acts or the recruited youth and people who had been 
directly affected, as this has proved effective among some community awareness programs.40 
The Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) in Mombasa, conducts inter-faith 
dialogues between youth, religious leaders and government officials to promote relationship 
building using faith as a driver for CVE. The Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) 
and the Interfaith Dialogues by the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) engage moderate 
religious leaders to reach and build capacity of youth to detect early signs of radicalization. 
They also train mosque monitors to systematically assess the quality and content of sermons 
and to observe mosque attendance. The focus of this initiative is to strengthen preaching skills 
with a focus on issues important for youth, and to better understand the processes of individual 
radicalization while safeguarding the reputation of mosques. This initiative also focused on 
increasing mosque attendance immediately after the mosque closures in 2014,41 removing 
                                                 
36 Interview, NGO Personnel, April 16, 2017. 
37 Interview, Community Leader, January 02, 2017. HAKI meaning rights in Swahili. The organization works on 
advocating principles for Humanity Activism Knowledge Integrity. 
38 Interview, Community Mobilizer, March 07, 2017. 
39 Interview, Community Mobilizer, May 07, 2016. 
40 Interview, Religious Leader, May 12, 2016. 
41 Attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, resulted in a stringent of hard approaches by the security sector, one 
being the high surveillance on Mosques suspected for radicalization and recruitment, resulting in the closure of 
some mosques. 
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negative connotations associated with mosques, and facilitating an avenue for at-risk-young 
people who are undecided or attracted to radical ideologies to attend moderate mosques instead 
of radical ones.42 This initiative was accompanied by strengthening the resilience of religious 
institutions by improving the administration of mosques, their leadership, and madrassa 
curriculum development.43 It is important that a mosque’s administration is constantly 
monitored by the community who nominate committee members in order to avoid the loss of 
credibility that would resulted from government appointed administrators.44 
Early warning systems have supported the law enforcement officials with pertinent 
information from the community on particular radical activities, suspected individuals or 
extremist preaching.45 The Nyumba Kumi initiative based on a ten-household security clusters 
has earned praise for gathering information on risk factors of radicalization and reporting either 
to the local police stations or the initiative’s  chief administrator at the village level. This system 
has, however, generated problems in Kwale County where extremists have reportedly 
assassinated Nyumba Kumi personnel after reporting of extremists and their activities to the 
law enforcement officials.46 Another NGO early warning system developed by the Kenya 
Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) gathers information at the community level from key 
individuals and groups of individuals for identifying violent activities and early signs of 
radicalization of individuals.47 
Gender-specific engagements to counter violent extremism are now necessary in light 
of the new roles adopted by women Al-Shabaab recruits, especially in the coast region (Daily 
Nation, 2016; Badurdeen 2017). The role of women as mothers, partners and friends are 
increasingly valued by extremist groups as direct and indirect sources of support for their 
operations. In her chapter, Roles, Motivations, and Recruitment Pathways of Kenyan Women 
                                                 
42 Interview, Community Mobilizer, June 15, 2017. 
43 Interview, Academic, January 21, 2017. 
44 Interview, Community Leader, January 12, 2017. 
45 Interview, Law Enforcement Official, March 03, 2017. 
46 Interview, Community Leader, May 12, 2016. 
47 Interview, NGO Personnel, January 05, 2017. 
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Recruited into the Al-Shabaab, Badurdeen (2018) highlights the different roles women play in 
Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan logistic operations, recruitment, and even combat. Women are vulnerable 
to deceptive strategies of recruitment that can involved being drugged, raped, and physically or 
socially coerced to join extremist groups. The importance of gender issues should be reflected 
in all CVE activities. Inclusion of women in the design and implementation of the programs is 
currently an unmet need in coastal CVE programs. The government and other stakeholders need 
to increase the involvement of women in CVE-related activities while recognizing their 
prominent role in families as wives, mothers, sisters, daughters and girlfriends.48 
Programs can involve women in different roles such as identifying early signs of 
radicalization, community policing, and peer-to-peer training that supports women at risk of 
recruitment or suffering from the impacts of violent extremism.49 Programs also need to provide 
psychological and social support for families of victims affected by violent extremism. This 
includes curative measures where the spouses and children, other family members, and friends 
who have joined violent extremist groups are provided assistance such as mentoring, 
counselling, and peer-to-peer support. Community support groups for rehabilitated women 
involved in violent extremist activities such as women returnees from Somalia, or Al-Shabaab 
defectors have provided a positive space for discussions and support towards rehabilitation, 
recovery and integration into their communities.50 These support groups contribute to capacity-
building, guidance on the importance of CVE interventions, life skills, and other benefits such 
as microfinance training, livelihood options, and entrepreneurial skills that assist those affected 
to change their lives instead of sinking into a state of poverty and stigmatization.51  
The role of the media is vital in building bridges between and within different 
communities, in reducing the appeal for violent extremist ideologies, and facilitating 
constructive discussions mitigating youth radicalization and recruitment. For example, Radio 
                                                 
48 Interview, Women Leader, March 14, 2017. 
49 Interview, Community Mobilizer, June 11, 2017. 
50 Interview, NGO Personnel, November 15, 2016. 
51 Interview, NGO Personnel, January 22, 2017. 
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Salaam, a Mombasa-based radio station, is engaged in producing radio features and discussions 
on radicalization and recruitment. Critical discussions and debate on relevant topics related to 
violent extremism stimulate thinking and influence related decisions while amplifying the voice 
of Muslims leaders committed to raising awareness and reducing radicalization and 
recruitment.52 Social media platforms directly support the growing trend of online 
radicalization and recruitment for the Al-Shabaab. These sites channel young people vulnerable 
to extremist websites and forums to online radical forums and networks (Badurdeen, 2018). 
Surveillance measures by law enforcement face challenges in keeping up with different forms 
of technology such as new encrypted forums and platforms used by extremists.53 Monitoring 
online platforms and websites for extremist content is an ongoing necessity for countering 
online radicalization and recruitment.54 This highlights the need for community leaders and law 
enforcement officials to be equipped with the knowledge and technical skills needed to employ 
technology in their CVE activities.55  
There should be greater investment at the school and community levels to encourage 
safe use of the Internet through skill training programs and initiatives to encourage parents to 
be aware what their children are browsing.56 Online literacy programs developed for schools 
and universities can help promote critical thinking among the youth and students equipping 
them with the skills to challenge and counter ideas promoted online by extremists.57  These 
measures, however, should not be misused for government surveillance of opposition 
movements or public dissent.58 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Interview, Religious Leader, September 23, 2016. 
53 Interview, Law Enforcement Official, June 21, 2017. 
54 Interview, Law enforcement Official, September 23, 2016. 
55 Interview, Law Enforcement Personnel, June 12, 2016. 
56 Interview, Youth Leader, May 02, 2016. 
57 Field Notes, January 02, 2017. 
58 Interview, NGO Personnel, May 22, 2017. 
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Interventions at the tertiary level 
 
Tertiary level interventions in CVE focus on approaches aimed at radicalized individuals and 
groups who may be actively planning, recruiting for, and abetting a violent extremist act or 
cause. Some individuals at this stage of radicalization may require counterterrorism approaches 
instead of CVE methods (Challgren et al. 2016). At the tertiary level interventions typically 
combine the role of law enforcement with intelligence from the community and security 
personnel. Tertiary CVE interventions include methods such as de-radicalization, 
disengagement, and rehabilitation. These kind of interventions necessitate expertise by 
psychologists, religious authorities, de-radicalized former extremists, and skilled community 
professionals. Interventions focus on preventing threats of impending violence and the 
individual’s or the group’s ability to carry out violence in the future. 
Research on radicalization processes among youth in Kenya has documented the 
multiple drivers involved and how these differ from one person to another.59 If an individual’s 
drivers are, for example, unemployment, poverty, revenge against the state, and persuasion by 
radical recruiters, interventions may combine career guidance, scholarships, vocational 
training, credit schemes, and countering ideologies.60 There are no one-size-fits-all 
prescriptions.  
Discriminatory policies towards Muslims and negative stereotypes affect youth on a 
personal level. These factors can make young Muslims feel they do not belong and cannot 
integrate into their society. Recognition by peers was highlighted by informants as a critical 
need for young men aspiring to be respected within their communities.61 Extremist 
organizations fill the need for recognition by giving them roles and positions within the 
organization accompanied by a feeling of belonging.62 Interventions targeting individuals need 
                                                 
59 Field notes, November 06 
60 Interview, Academic, May 12, 2016. 
61 Interview, Community Mobilizer, May 16, 2017. 
62 Interview, NGO Personnel, November 12, 2016. 
  
 
 
 
 
Badurdeen & Goldsmith: Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the 
Coastal Region of Kenya 
 
 
 
 
90 
to be tailored to address the specific unmet needs of young people vulnerable to radicalization. 
Failure to address these unmet needs provides a conducive environment for extremist 
organizations such as the Al-Shabaab stepping in to satisfy these unmet needs.63 At the 
individual level, interventions need to focus in transforming individual behaviors and the 
attitudes of the radicalized, vulnerable youth, and Al-Shabaab sympathizers.64 Similar 
interventions need to focus on attitudinal changes of young people and their families who are 
stigmatized by association.  Other methods are required for rehabilitating youth who work as 
radical entrepreneurs for the Al-Shabaab or are active agents of violent extremism in the coastal 
region.  
The delicate and complex nature of the process of disengagement of returnees or 
defectors requires a multifaceted approach of careful planning.65 Disengagement is complicated 
by the context of fear and suspicion. Those who disengage fear being prosecuted by law 
enforcement, the possibility of execution by Al-Shabaab, and rejection by the community—all 
of which make them afraid of leaving the extremist group.66 The state has been active in the 
disengagement and reintegration process of former Al-Shabaab recruits, who are often referred 
to as “returnees,” although some refer to them as defectors, under the Government Amnesty 
Program.67 
There are three reasons why the role of reintegrated ex-Al-Shabaab members can be 
vital in CVE efforts: first, their stories provide insights into and in-depth understanding of the 
radicalization-recruitment process in addition to the dynamics of Al-Shabaab’s internal 
organization. Second, they can be proactive actors in providing intelligence on the tactics and 
                                                 
63 Interview, Women Leader, September 23, 2016. 
64 At risk youth include youth who may have family members or relatives in extremist groups, or is involved in 
illegal activities such as substance abuse or gang activities or young people or are from particular locations 
identified as hotspots for Al-Shabaab radicalization. 
65 Like in many other countries, Kenya has no clear DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and 
CVE linkage in policy and practice. However, there is a need to cross-fertilize CVE and DDR specifically with 
regard to the reintegration process of returnees or defectors as the process overlaps geospatially. This will prevent 
recidivism (Piedmont, 2015) 
66 Interview, Community Leader, May 06, 2017. 
67 Immediately after the Garissa University attack which killed 148 people, the Kenyan government launched its 
amnesty programme offering amnesty and appropriate reintegration to youth who had joined the Al-Shabaab. 
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strategies used by Al-Shabaab. Third, they are useful contributors to the development of 
interventions designed for the disengagement and demobilization process of other youth.68 
There have been efforts by community based organizations to use disengaged youth or returnees 
in their work as mentors or community mobilizers. However, these efforts have been at a 
minimum due to the difficulties encountered in trusting ex-Al-Shabaab members and the 
unclear nature of legislations in working with Al-Shabaab returnees or members. Their 
participation is dependent on the provision of security and an enabling environment giving them 
hope for a new future. Caution needs to be exercised with ex-Al Shabaab members who may 
come via the government’s amnesty program as they may be viewed as spies or sleepers, or 
may be suspected to be involved in gathering information on the whereabouts of other returnees. 
This can endanger the life of other returnees as was the case of individuals in Kwale who have 
been threatened or killed after their return. There is a need for close scrutiny of the ex-militants 
and must be made part of the program, especially if they have gone through adequate 
rehabilitation and reintegration.  
The stigma and fear involved in working with ex-combatants explain why many donors 
and CSOs do not work with them as part of their mandates.69 Rehabilitation programs should 
be tailored to work on an individual basis. There is a need for proper psycho-social support for 
individuals with suitable mentors and livelihood and employment initiatives addressing their 
future goals.70 Constant counseling and countering extremist ideologies by credible leaders can 
reduce extremist tendencies among radical prisoners. Similarly, systematic rehabilitation 
programs for reforming ex-Al Shabaab members will assist these members to contribute 
positively in the community. 
Therefore, tertiary level interventions in CVE aimed at micro-level, focuses on 
radicalized individuals and groups who may be actively planning, recruiting for, and abetting a 
violent extremist act or cause. Interventions such as de-radicalization, disengagement, and 
                                                 
68 Interview, Community Mobilizer, March 22, 2017. 
69 Field notes, November 14, 2016. 
70 Interview, NGO Personnel, March 06, 2017. 
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rehabilitation and often concentrates in the radicalized individual and his or her family members 
and on threats of impending violence and the individual’s or the group’s ability to carry out 
violence in the future. However, most interventions at this stage is expensive and time 
consuming and requires expertise by psychologists, religious authorities, de-radicalized former 
extremists, and skilled community professionals.  
 
Conclusion: Pathways for enhancing CVE interventions on the Coast of Kenya 
 
Collaboration involving the national government, county governments, and international 
organizations can facilitate incorporation of best practices for rehabilitation and the 
corresponding lessons learned by stakeholders contributing to Kenya’s CVE efforts.71 The 
Public Health model for CVE that provided the framework for this overview emphasizes a pre-
emptive engagement to violent extremism by evaluating, addressing, and mitigating the wide-
ranging dynamics of violent extremism. The article mapped the primary, secondary and tertiary 
CVE interventions in the coastal region of Kenya.  The study revealed the need for a well-
designed version of public health model to define, guide, and implement CVE. The model 
should focus on a well-planned system incorporating both government and non-government 
actors as well as defining who and at which phase of the radicalization process should be 
involved in mitigation efforts. The design of the system should take into consideration pre-
existing prevention efforts. Organizations active in the field of CVE can utilize the model to 
determine where they could fit within the CVE spectrum in order to reduce duplication efforts 
and to achieve maximum efficiency.  
Most interventions reveal the ad hoc nature of previous interventions that in turn 
highlights the need for a better CVE leadership. The National CVE strategy under the National 
Counter Terrorism Centre is commendable, but more effort is needed in communicating the 
strategy to the civil society organizations engaged in CVE.  
                                                 
71 Field Notes, January 12, 2017. 
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Practitioners and policy makers working on CVE recognize the need for stronger 
evidence-based interventions in improving the design and effective implementation of CVE 
policies and programs. The need for evidence led interventions and information sharing 
underscores the need for primary data illuminating the localized contexts of radicalization and 
extremism. Such information and knowledge are crucial for designing interventions that 
counter these processes (Zeiger and Aly, 2015). However, the challenges in gathering 
information has been linked to the difficulties in measuring attitudes of de-radicalized 
individuals as attitudinal change is often long-term, and the required capacity needed for 
evaluations by implementing organizations. Although some research on CVE in the coastal 
region of Kenya exists, it has yet to translate into enhanced organizational interventions.72  
Some of the constraints limiting the use of empirical findings begin with the variation 
in local contexts influencing the definition of CVE. Contested preferences regarding how we 
define CVE shape individual interventions. Most often these definitions mirror donor 
preferences and the biases of implementing organizations.73 Targeted CVE interventions like 
countering extremist narratives may require specific contextual definitions appropriate to the 
religious sentiments generating emotions and animosity among communities. As stated by one 
respondent, CVE is often tied to Islamic extremism in a manner that results in the programs 
stereotyping and stigmatization a particular Muslim community.74  
Most interventions in coastal Kenya are based on perceptions of the recruitment into the 
Al-Shabaab rather than case studies that emphasize the experience of individuals who travelled 
the violent extremist path.75 In the article ‘Reality Versus Perception: Toward Understanding 
Boko Haram in Nigeria’, the authors highlighted the need to evaluate the perceptions of CVE 
practitioners against the testimony of at risk youth and former recruits to violent extremist 
organizations (Botha and Abdille, 2017). Research in such areas is constrained by the time 
                                                 
72 Interview with NGO member, May 16, 2017. 
73 Field notes, February 11, 2017. 
74 Interview, NGO Personnel, January 02, 2017. 
75 Interview, NGO Personnel, November 22, 2016. 
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required for in-depth field work, funding, difficulty of access, and the shortage of experienced 
researchers with expertise in working with hard to reach populations. Triangulating data from 
multiple sources is necessary as a consequence, which requires collaboration between law 
enforcement personnel and communities.76 Implications of the lack of in-depth data on a 
phenomenon like recruitment pathways compromise the inability to forecast trends in 
recruitment and may contribute to superficial mitigation projects that consume limited 
resources. Campaigns designed to counter violent extremism online often proceed without 
appropriate research into the phenomenon of online violent extremism.77 More empirical 
research is needed on how social media affects the behavior of individuals before making 
assumptions on how the process of online radicalization can be prevented (Zeiger and Aly 
2015). 
Evidence-based interventions need platforms for research and information sharing. 
There is currently little academic research on violent extremism and the findings from research 
institutes and think-tanks. This accounts for the programs that do not cater for implementable 
strategies that address the issues of a particular region.78 There is a need for more CVE research 
dissemination, the sharing of best practices and research methodologies, and lessons learned. 
Some examples of regional initiatives bridging academics, policy makers and practitioners 
include the BRICS (Building Resilience in Civil Society in Kenya), The Rift Valley Institute 
forums on CVE, and the policy studies by Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies 
(CHRIPS). There is a need to invest in more research on recruitment via the social media 
platforms, crime and the terrorism nexus, young people and their resilience towards violent 
extremism, terrorism and the human trafficking connection, gaps in the existing de-
radicalization process of former combatants under the government amnesty offer, and the 
strategies of radical preachers. Also, researching violent radicalization group dynamics and 
                                                 
76 Interview, Academic, June 12, 2017. 
77 Interview, NGO Personnel, January 02, 2017. 
78 Field Notes, November 06, 2016. 
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networking processes will benefit from knowledge from various other fields of study such as 
cult or gang research, social media analysis, drug networks, and social movements. 
Academic partnerships with law enforcement organizations can enhance interventions 
disrupting different recruitment pathways.79 These partnerships could operationalize studies 
related to the offline and online channels of communication with the aim of reducing online 
radicalization and recruitment.80 These interventions aimed at intercepting ‘or spying’ should 
not be turned into a mass surveillance targeting communities or state attempts to curb voices of 
political dissent (Badurdeen, 2018)  
Interventions specific to local communities should take into account contextual 
differences like the local factors conditioning embedded webs of community relationships.81 
Solutions need to be localized where the communities own the process and local CSOs play a 
vital role by utilizing their local expertise. In these cases, caution is necessary to avoid a small 
group of local elite CSOs taking control of the CVE interventions, and the CVE funding must 
be managed to promote diversity among CSOs working in the field.  
Very few community organizations are involved or have capacity to be involved at the 
project conception stages, which are often controlled by donors influenced by their domestic 
CVE models.82 Also, organizations working on CVE tend to lose focus on domestic violent 
extremist trends and patterns when they have to respond to extraneous factors featuring in donor 
proposals. There is a need to encourage bottom up projects driven by empirical research. One 
example is the case of radicalization or recruitment linked to human smuggling or trafficking 
networks or recruitment of youth through educational institutions. Community attitudes should 
be assessed before launching projects such as sensitization, awareness campaigns, 
disseminating particular tools of CVE, or using technical terminology that may alienate local 
communities. Likewise, community attitudes should be assessed before designing reintegration 
                                                 
79 Interviewee, Law Enforcement Official, January 02, 2017. 
80 Field Notes, June 12, 2016. 
81 Interview, CBO member, May 22, 2017. 
82 Field notes, January 02, 2017. 
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programs for returnees or Al-Shabaab defectors where community support is vital for effective 
reintegration.83 A policy approach for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
requires an instrumental shift addressing the DDR-CVE intersection designating that DDR be 
viewed as a conflict prevention measure rather than a post-conflict peace building effort. This 
will address the phenomenon of recidivism among members of armed groups.  
Monitoring and evaluation frameworks should avoid one-size-fits all solutions for 
different CVE interventions. There is a corresponding need for capacity building programs for 
local institutions to develop institutional monitoring and evaluation with a view towards sharing 
good practices.84 
With the emergence of decentralized CVE plans at the county levels in Kenya, it is 
expected that different CVE approaches will be integrated to minimize duplication of projects.85 
The county CVE plans will ideally include a macro-level approach to measure the overall 
impact of different projects on the community as well as to learn from failures. This would also 
facilitate understanding the secondary and tertiary effects of different CVE interventions across 
different locations.  
 The article has highlighted the prevailing gaps in CVE programming and practice. A 
broader analysis including evaluations of particular projects could shed more light on the impact 
of the projects. More reflections on the impact of CVE initiatives at the individual and 
community level is vital for the sustainability of projects that can be replicated in similar regions 
suffering the violent effects of youth radicalization and recruitment for terrorist networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Interview, NGO member, May 16, 2017. 
84 Field notes, December 28, 2016. 
85 Interview, Academic, September 16, 2016. 
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